ISI& 



I 



Hollinger Corp. 
pH 8.5 




AE ECONOMIC 
WEAPON 

In the JVar Against Germany 



BY 

A. E. ZIMMERN 



NEW YORK 
GEORGE H. DORAN COMPANY 



FricCy Five Cents 



Uj^vvJl 



" The power of radical decision of a world-war has slipped away from 
the armies. The strategical situation is conditioned by the world- 
economic situation. . . . Victories which once would have been ab- 
solutely decisive, and the conquest of whole kingdoms, have not 
brought us nearer to peace. ''^ — General von Freytag-Loringhoven, 
Deputy-Chief of the German General Staff, in his recently pub- 
lished book Deductions from the World War, as quoted in the 
Frankfurter Zeitung. 



GIFT 

«0V 3 ISi« 



-2} 435* 
THE ECONOMIC WEAPON 



IN one of the frank and lucid speeches with which he 
has lately been enlightening the country, General Smuts 
spoke of the "economic situation" as ''the most im- 
portant matter of all" — more important, that is, even than 
the vast military effort on the Western front and elsewhere. 
It is a big claim to make : but General Smuts is a man who 
measures his words, and the claim is amply justified. Eco- 
nomic considerations do undoubtedly dominate the whole 
war-situation, constituting an immeasurable influence in our 
favour. No one knows this better than the directing minds 
among the enemy. But as the operation of economic fac- 
tors is as gradual and invisible as that of armed forces is 
rapid and resounding, we are apt to be misled — and the 
enemy does his best to mislead us — by superficial demon- 
strations and to ignore the more deep-lying and permanent 
factors which condition the entire situation and must ulti- 
mately turn it in our favour. 

What is the economic situation? It can be stated in a 
sentence : The Central Powers are being besieged by prac- 
tically the entire world and they have no means at their dis- 
posal for bringing the siege to an end. 

It will be most convenient to consider these two aspects 
of the situation separately — first the siege itself, and then 
the position as regards the raising of the siege. 

To describe the war as a prolonged siege may seem at 
first sight an exaggeration or a metaphor, because there 
has never before in history been an investment on such an 
immense scale. Cities have been besieged, and even prov- 
inces, as in the American Civil War ; but there seems some- 
thing absurd and unreal about the siege of half of one con- 

1 



2 The Economic Weapon 

tinent and a large slice of another. The German Chan- 
cellor took advantage of this very natural feeling when he 
declared in his speech in December, 191 5, that a territory 
which stretches from Arras to Mesopotamia cannot be re- 
duced by economic pressure. . . . ''Does anyone seriously 
believe," he went on to ask rhetorically, ''that we can lose 
the war on account of a shortage of rubber?" By select- 
ing one article out of many the Chancellor's question, of 
course, evades the point. But if we ask whether Germany 
can lose the war on account of a shortage of essential food- 
stuffs and raw materials, whether, in the Chancellor's own 
words, she "can be reduced by economic pressure," the an- 
swer is emphatically Yes. The peoples of the Central Em- 
pires know that they are living in a state of siege, or, as 
one of their ablest writers, Friedrich Naumann, the author 
of Central Europe, picturesquely calls it, "in an economic 
prison-house," and that sooner or later a point of exhaus- 
tion must be reached. The wiser heads have known it 
ever since the British declaration of war : for thinking Ger- 
mans have reflected more upon the implications of sea- 
power than many of our own countrymen. They were 
quick to realise the full meaning of British naval supremacy 
and what it would involve for Germany to be cut off from 
the seas and markets and supply centres of the world. Three 
pieces of evidence, out of many which could be cited, are 
worth giving on this point because of their authoritative 
character. 

Dr. Walter Rathenau, the chairman of the Allgemeine 
Elektrizitatsgesellschaft, one of the leading German indus- 
trial enterprises, and a man in close touch with governing 
circles in Germany, gave a public lecture in December, 
191 5, on the organisation of the Raw Materials Department 
of the German War Office, of which he was the first head. 
In the course of his lecture, which was subsequently pub- 
lished, he remarked: — 

"On the fourth of August of last year, when England 
declared war, a terrible and unprecedented thing happened 
— our country became a besieged fortress. Closed in by 
land and sea, it was thrown upon its own resources, and 



The Economic Weapon 3 

a prospect of war opened out before us boundless in time 
and expense, in danger and sacrifice. 

"Three da3^s after the declaration of war I could bear 
the uncertainty as to our position no longer. I asked for 
an interview with the head of the General War Depart- 
ment, Colonel Scheuch, and was kindly received by him 
on the evening of August 8th. I explained to him that our 
country could presumably only be provided for a limited 
number of months with the indispensable materials for 
carrying on war. His estimate as to the duration of the 
war was as considerable as mine, so I had to ask him the 
question : 'What has been done, what can be done, to 
avert the danger of the throttling of Germany?' Very lit- 
tle had been done. But a great deal was to be done, for 
interest had been awakened. When I returned home, anx- 
ious and full of foreboding, I found a telegram from the 
War Minister, Von Falkenhayn, inviting me to an inter- 
view next morning." 

The result of that interview. Dr. Rathenau goes on to 
tell us, was the organisation of a Department for the se- 
curing and controlling of raw material supplies ; and, thanks 
to this organisation and to wholesale requisitions at home 
and in the occupied territories Germany has been able to 
"make both ends meet" in the military sphere up to the 
present time — at the expense of the civilian population. 
But the supplies thus obtained and husbanded are not a 
widow's cruse. They cannot be magically renewed; and 
all the recent evidence goes to show that it is those who are 
nearest the centre of things who are most anxious about 
the situation. 

Thus, to come to our second piece of evidence. Dr. Hein- 
rich Pudor, of Leipzig, an economist, who mentions inci- 
dentally that he has been at work at the Raw Materials De- 
partment of the German War Office on an inventory of the 
available supplies of iron ore, copper, wolfram, and nickel, 
recently contributed an article to the July- August, 191 7, 
number of W eltwirtschaft , the organ of the German As- 
sociation for Promoting Foreign Trade, in the course of 
which he makes the following admission : — 



4 The Economic Weapon 

'We must face the fact that our apprehensions about 
shortage of raw material are well founded, both as regards 
our manufactures and our military requirements. We must 
realise that we are now living not only on the remains of 
our stocks of raw material, but even in large part on shoddy 
or resurrected materials; neither of these sources of sup- 
ply can last for ever, and both will be practically exhausted 
at the end of the war." 

The writer does not expressly say that the war will end 
when, or because, the supplies in question are exhausted; 
he merely indicates to the German reader that, when the 
war happens to end, the cupboard will be bare : but the in- 
ference is obvious. Such a statement, coming from such 
a source, is sufficient in itself to explain the eagerness, not 
of the German people — for that may be attributed to other 
causes — but of the German military authorities to ^'extort" 
a speedy peace. 

But, it may be asked, did not the Germans prepare for 
the war years beforehand, and did they not foresee the 
need for supplies that would ensue and forearm themselves 
against it? The answer to this is that the German authori- 
ties did prepare for the war, on the economic as well as on 
the military side, but that they made a double miscalcula- 
tion. They miscalculated the duration of the war, and 
they miscalculated the amount of military material that 
would be needed in modern fighting. The interview re- 
corded just now between Dr. Rathenau and the German 
War Office official shows how the circumstances attending 
Great Britain's entry into the war — not itself outside their 
calculations — caused them to revise their estimate and 
reckon on the possibility of a long war. We know from 
other sources that the consumption of material in the early 
days of the war was so great as to lead to a munitions 
shortage in Germany long before our own crisis in May, 

1915. 

But on the point of German economic preparedness a 
further piece of evidence has come to light which is worth 
quoting. At a meeting of the Associated German Cham- 
bers of Commerce in August, 19 16, several speakers se- 



The Economic Weapon 5 

verely criticised the Government for its want of foresight 
in the economic sphere and the inadequacy of its prepara- 
tory organisation. This brought a defender of the Gov- 
ernment to his feet. He reminded his fellow-members that 
the Government had made preparations in view of a war 
with England. He recalled the summoning of a Confer- 
ence at the Ministry of the Interior at BerHn in May, 191 4, 
at which representatives of trade, agriculture, industry, and 
handicrafts were present, to discuss this very subject on 
the hypothesis of a war ''even with England as an enemy 
and with a complete blockade of the North Sea" : but, as 
he significantly continues, the plans were made on an esti- 
mate *'of a war of one year's duration at the outside." 

Thus, on the admission of the Germans themselves, *'the 
territory from Arras to Mesopotamia" is, literally speak- 
ing, besieged. How soon is the siege likely to be effec- 
tive ? No one can say. It depends on physical and moral, 
as well as material, factors beyond our power of calcula- 
tion. What one can say with assurance is that the effect 
of a shortage of any kind, involving the use of substitutes 
whether of foodstuffs or materials, is cumulative, and that 
with every month that the war proceeds the privations of 
the civil population become more unendurable, and the 
problems of the military chiefs more difficult of solution. 
But if one cannot predict the time or the nature of the ulti- 
mate collapse, one can tell with fair exactness where the 
chief points of difficulty arise. 

The point where the shoe pinches worst is not that on 
which most attention has been fixed in this country — food- 
stuffs. It is true that the food supply in the Central Em- 
pires, especially in the industrial districts, has been and 
still is very inadequate both in quantity and quality, and 
that the problems attending its distribution have given rise 
to a very large amount of discontent and discussion be- 
tween different parts of the country and different classes 
of the population. The shortage of animal and vegetable 
fats has been especially felt. It is undeniable that the 
health of the population has suffered and is suffering se- 
verely and that its working power is temporarily and, in 



6 The Economic Weapon 

many cases, permanently weakened. Moreover, the lack 
of feeding-stuffs for animals, of which in particular Ger- 
many imported large quantities, has made a gap in the 
food supply which has led to all sorts of other consequences, 
acting as one link in a vicious circle from which there is 
no escape. It is admitted too that, owing to the absence 
of artificial manures, the soil is becoming worked out and 
its yield must show a progressive diminution, even apart 
from the shortage of labour and animals. 

Nevertheless it is contended by cool-headed observers 
that, if Germany holds fast, and if the food regulations are 
loyally carried out as between town and country, she can, 
at a pinch, adapt her food supply arrangements to blockade 
conditions, and "win through," though at the price of great 
discomfort to all and great suffering to the many. No im- 
partial student of the war expects Germany to be "starved 
out" : some perhaps, for reasons of humanity or policy, 
neither expect nor desire it. But it is not in the sphere 
of food-stuffs that the pressure is most severe. It is the 
deficiency of raw materials of which the German authori- 
ties live in most dread. 

Germany has built up her economic life, to a far greater 
extent than any other Continental country, on a foundation 
of imported raw materials. Endowed by nature with com- 
paratively limited natural advantages and resources, of 
which coal, iron, and potash are the chief, she ov/es her 
prosperity to the industry and technical ability of her peo- 
ple in working up imported raw materials into manufac- 
tured articles. Of the total German imports in 191 3, 58 
per cent, consisted of industrial raw materials and semi- 
manufactured articles. A glance at the list of these raw 
materials will show how vital they are, not simply to the 
maintenance of her civilian population in a civilised con- 
dition of life, but also to the upkeep of her military es- 
tablishment. 

Foremost in the list come the fabrics, cotton, wool, silk, 
and flax, to which must be added hemp and jute. For all 
of these Germany is very largely dependent on foreign 
countries; in the case of cotton, silk, and jute, of course, 



The Economic Weapon 7 

entirely. The shortage of clothing is now so great that 
paper-woven fabrics are being largely worn, even as un- 
derclothing, in spite of its roughness, while the authori- 
ties have long since requisitioned cast-off clothing, and made 
elaborate arrangements to regulate purchases. By this 
means the clothing of the army at the front, though not 
what it was, has so far been passably maintained. 

Leather, furs, and rubber constitute another group of 
indispensable commodities : for the discovery of artificial 
rubber, so often announced, has not been confirmed, and 
the various substitutes for shoe leather have not proved sat- 
isfactory. *'An army," said Napoleon, '^marches upon its 
stomach." But it also marches, more literally, upon its 
boots; and whatever the Chancellor may say, when the 
army boot is no longer equal to the task of combating 
Flanders mud, the days of German resistance on the West- 
ern front will be numbered. 

A third and still more important group is that compris- 
ing mineral resources: copper, tin, platinum, aluminium, 
nickel, manganese, and other lesser known but equally in- 
dispensable minerals, such as wolfram. How important 
these are, and how anxious is the situation regarding them, 
may be judged not only from the statement quoted above 
from the German War Office expert, but from the whole- 
sale requisitioning of church bells and other articles, pub- 
lic or domestic, to be melted down for military use. 

in the autumn of 191 5, when these preoccupations first 
began to weigh upon the mind of the German people, the 
German Government v/as at pains to persuade its pubHc 
that the drive through to the Balkans had relieved the po- 
sition, and that Bulgaria and Turkey would supply the de- 
ficiencies of Germany and Austria-Hungary. For about a 
year the idea that Central Europe (as the area from Ant- 
werp to Bagdad was rather oddly called) was or could be 
made into a self-contained ''economic block" enjoyed great 
vogue. But closer inspection of the natural resources of 
that region dissipated the dream. It was realised that 
domination over the lands from the North Sea to the Per- 
sian Gulf, however exclusive and unquestioned, could not 



8 



The Economic Weapon 



possibly compensate Germany for the breaking off of her 
oversea connections. 

A great reaction set in in favour of unrestricted inter- 
national trade, and even Naumann, the propagandist of 
Central Europe, has lately recanted and proclaimed his de- 
votion to the cause of *'free intercourse." The reason for 
this volteface is best given in the following table, which is 
taken from an article by a Berlin professor (Dr. Tyzska) 
in a newspaper specially devoted to Central European ques- 
tions. The figures speak for themselves: — 

The Share of Central Europe {i.e., Austria-Hungary, Roumania 
Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece, and Turkey) in Supplying Ger- 
many WITH Industrial Raw^Materials in 1913. 





Import into Germany in 
thousands of marks. 


Percent- 
age 


Article. 


Total 
import. 


Import 

from 
Central 
Europe. 


from 
Central 
Europe. 


Cotton 

Wool 

Copper 

Hides 

Silk 

Furs 

Iron ores 

Rubber . . . . . 
Petroleum 


607,124 
412,793 
335,271 
321,699 
154,691 
121,864 
227,091 

125,939 
69,884 


2,092 
3,380 

17,591 
3,482 
6,422 
1,961 

11,968 


0*03 
o'oS 

5-46 
2-25 

5*27 
0-86 

17-12 



The same disproportion between the contribution of Cen- 
tral Europe and the rest of the world holds good, broadly 
speaking, of Germany's imports of food-stuffs and fod- 
der; and it is, of course, obvious that Central Europe can 
still less replace the outer world as a market for German 
manufactures. The article in question concludes with an 
expression of opinion which is repeated in substance by 
writer after writer on the subject: — 



The Economic Weapon d 

"The most important thing is, and remains that Ger- 
many must keep a free hand, and be put in a position to 
carry through far-reaching connections with the business of 
the whole world. She must not hang Central Europe like 
a weight of lead to her feet, to retard her progress in deal- 
ing with the outer world; on the contrary, she must dis- 
cover a method which will make possible an economic rap- 
prochement with those countries, without prejudice to her 
economic position in the world as a whole/' 

Is it within her power to ''discover" such a ''method"? 
Is Germany, in fact, in a position to cause the siege of her 
territory to be raised? This is the question to which we 
must now turn. 

It was said above that the Central Powers are being be- 
sieged by practically the whole world. This has, of course, 
only been the case since the adoption of the unrestricted 
submarine war at the beginning of the present year. As 
a result of this, the United States broke off diplomatic re- 
lations and then declared war, and subsequently, follow- 
ing the American example, other States, hitherto neutral, 
either severed relations or took the full step of declaring 
war. The most important among the latter group are Bra- 
zil and China, though the action of smaller States, such 
as Siam and Liberia, and the various Central and South 
American Republics is not to be lightly dismissed. 

The importance of the accession of these numerous States 
to the Allied ranks is often under-estimated. It is impor- 
tant both as regards the conduct of the siege itself and as 
regards the conditions of its raising. The actual siege is, 
of course, being conducted, as it has been from the begin- 
ning, by the British Navy, aided by the fleets of the Allies. 
But so long as a large part of the world remained neutral, 
and anxious to trade freely with both sides, the work of 
the besieging force was naturally hampered by diplomatic 
considerations and respect for "neutral rights." The ex- 
perience of the war has conclusively demonstrated, even 
to the peace-loving American people, that neutrality in a 
conflict between Right and Might is an impossible posi- 
tion to maintain : but it took some time to drive this les- 



10 The Economic Weapon 

son home and meanwhile, however much the ''politicians" 
may be criticised for interfering with the work of the 
"sailors," it must be admitted that British foreign policy 
has been eminently successful in avoiding conflict on the 
subject of neutral rights and in facilitating the inevitable 
transition of those Powers who (unlike the smaller Euro- 
pean neutrals) were free to follow the dictates of their 
feelings from neutrality to active sympathy and interven- 
tion. Their support has been and is an immense advan- 
tage to the besieging force by cutting off supplies at the 
source. It was always physically possible, for instance, 
to interfere with the American trade with Scandinavia: 
but it is far better that there should be very little trade to 
be interfered with; and thanks to the United States em- 
bargo law, following on the American entry into the war, 
that is more and more becoming the position. 

Thus the siege has been drawn closer year by year as the 
war has gone on and one loophole after another has been 
stopped up. It has been pungently said that ''the chief 
achievement of the German army in the war has been to 
conquer Germany's allies." It may be said with equal truth 
that the chief achievement of the British Navy in the war 
has been to conquer the co-operation of the world. Faced 
with the delicate and invidious duty of interfering with the 
business arrangements and connections of peace-loving peo- 
ples all over the globe, the British Navy has secured recog- 
nition by four-fifths of mankind, not simply as a legitimate 
weapon in the hands of one group of Powers fighting an- 
other, but as the executive instrument of the public law of 
the world. 

What is the bearing of all this on the question of the rais- 
ing of the siege? Simply that the siege does not now de- 
pend on the British Navy alone, but on the public policy 
of the overwhelming majority of the great trading and 
producing countries of the world. What will happen in 
the normal course when peace is signed ? The British Navy 
will retire to its peace-stations, its patrols will no longer 
stop and examine ships, and, so far as the action of armed 
forces is concerned, trade will resume its normal course. 



The Economic Weapon 11 

But will the cessation o£ the physical blockade of German 
harbours by itself involve the raising of the siege? Will 
it ensure the restocking and revictualling of the Central 
Empires with the food, fodder, raw materials, and other 
supplies of which they are so much in need? This is the 
question which is being anxiously asked not only by the 
directors of German policy but in every intelligent Ger- 
man household. When, and how, is Germany going to 
secure the cotton and wool, the leather and the rubber, the 
copper and other commodities which she needs for the 
health of her population and for the resumption of her com- 
mercial and industrial life on its normal basis? 

The German Government, like our own, has appointed a 
Minister of Reconstruction — or rather, to give him his cor- 
rect bureaucratic title, an 'Tmperial Commissioner for 
Transition Economy.'' But Reconstruction is no more than 
a name and a series of paper schemes until the siege has 
been effectively raised — till the authorities can assure them- 
selves of a sufficiency of the essential supplies. Rapid de- 
mobilisation, for instance, will be a matter of importance 
not only for social and political reasons, but also in or- 
der to get the population back to productive work as soon 
as possible. But without raw materials there can be no 
industrial employment; and demobilisation without employ- 
ment ready to hand for the disbanded soldier spells social 
disorder. As Dr. Dernburg said, in a very frank review 
of the post-war economic situation in a recent article, ''Even 
a partial period of unemployment would lead to disastrous 
manifestations," and for that reason "demobilisation will 
certainly extend over a long period, however irksome it 
may be to those with the colours." The Allies in fact, not 
by their armed forces but by their command of essential 
supplies, control the demobilisation of the German army 
and therewith the whole process of German recuperation. 

Germany, who has so often declared that she entered the 
war to "safeguard her economic future," has in truth ir- 
retrievably compromised it. Instead of securing a posi- 
tion of economic independence such as she considered nec- 
essary to the dignity of a "World-Power," she is placed 



12 The Economic Weapon 

in a humiliating position of dependence on a world which 
she has antagonised. Her agents, open and disguised, are 
now scouring the markets of the world in the unpromis- 
ing task of buying up supplies here and there in the hope 
of being able to ship them after the war. But almost 
everywhere they go they find opinion turned against them, 
and the old watchwords and inducements of ^'business is 
business" have lost much of their force. The German 
Government has indeed long since recognised, and allowed 
its publicists to proclaim, that it cannot face a peace which 
leaves Germany's present enemies free to adopt any policy 
they wish in the economic sphere. 

So serious is the economic outlook, and so impossible is 
it to conceal it from the German people, that the chief 
diplomatic effort of the German Government at the pres- 
ent time is directed to securing a ground of negotiation with 
the enemy on the basis of the exchange of occupied terri- 
tory in return for economic concessions, including specific 
international provisions safeguarding Germany against dif- 
ferential treatment of any kind. Even this, it is recognised, 
would only very partially avert the trouble: for normal 
trade is carried on not between Governments but between 
individuals ; and no treaties or guarantees in the world can 
force the public to buy or merchants to deal in goods which 
they would prefer not to handle. It is fully recognised that, 
even when the initial diflficulty of securing raw materials 
has been overcome, Germany's export trade must suffer 
from psychological difBculties on which she did not count 
before the war. 

But in the immediate post-war period, when the question 
of supplies will have to be dealt with, trade will be for the 
most part not between individuals but between Govern- 
ments. The staple trades of the world will be State-con- 
trolled. This is inevitable for two reasons: the world- 
shortage of shipping and the world-shortage of the chief 
food-stuffs and raw materials. Shipping will be short be- 
cause of the submarine campaign and military needs (e.g., 
the immense movement of troops in demobilisation). Sup- 
plies will be short because of the withdrawal of labour 



The Economic Weapon 13 

from production, intensified, in some cases, by unfavour- 
able natural conditions. The whole civilised world will be 
faced, in fact, at the close of hostilities with the prospect 
of a shortage, if not of a famine, over a period calculated 
by so cautious a judge as the Permanent Secretary of our 
Board of Agriculture at no less than three years. 

Thus demand will in any case seriously outrun sup- 
ply ; and there will be far more buyers in the world's mar- 
kets than can be satisfied. Some will have to go short. 
Who more naturally than Germany? It is not as if the 
boycott had to be organised. It will come about almost of 
itself unless special provision is made in the peace. Thus 
it is that the Power which, like a second Napoleon, has 
overrun vast tracts of territory and sucked them dry is 
now in the position of having to acknowledge that the con- 
quest of whole kingdoms has left it in the weaker position. 
Germany has conquered Belgium, Poland, Serbia, Lithu- 
ania, Courland and Friuli. But the Allies have conquered 
cotton, wool, jute, leather, copper, and feeding-stuffs. No 
one who reads the German Press or follows the manoeuvres 
of German diplomatic agents can doubt who holds the 
stronger cards at the present time. Nor, even if the worst 
came to the worst in disorganised Russia, would the situa- 
tion be altered. 

It is the Western and oversea Allies, with their com- 
mand of the sea and their control of tropical products, who 
control the siege. Their position is impregnable, and it 
grows stronger day by day, simply by the efflux of time. 
This is not the place in which to suggest how the Allied 
economic superiority can best be used or what form oi eco- 
nomic settlement will best conduce to the establishment of 
the new order towards which the civilised peoples are as- 
piring. It is enough to emphasise the fact that the eco- 
nomic weapon is the most powerful in the varied armoury 
of the Allies, and that, if the Alliance holds together and 
consolidates its forces, no human power can prevent it from 
ultimately — and indeed, as all the omens indicate, soon 
rather than late — bringing victorv. final and decisive, to the 
Allied cause. 



Important Booki 



1 TRRORY OF CONGRESS ^^ 

mm... 



THE CRIME By a Cermai iilllllWIW 

An arraignment in even more cogent ®20 9 ^ accuse i" of the 
rulers and governments of Germany and Austria. 

Two vols. 8vo. Vol. I. Net, $2.50 

THE GREAT CRIME AND ITS MORAL By J. Selden Willmore 

A volume which is an invaluable library. An illuminating summary of 
the immense documentary literature of the war. 8vo. Net, $2.00 

BELGIUM IN WAR TIME By Commandant De Gerlache De Comery 

Translated from the French Edition by Bernard Miall 

The authoritative book essential to an understanding of the history, the 
position and the sufferings of the country that will not die, the title of 
the Norwegian and Swedish editions of this famous work set up under 
fire. Illustrations, maps and facsimiles. 8vo. Net, $2.00 

I'HE BATTLE OF THE SOMME By John Buchan 

"Mr. Buchan's account is a clear and brilliant presentation of the whole 

vast manoeuver and its tactical and strategic development through all 

four stages." — Springfield Republican. Illustrated. 12mo. Net, $1.50 

THE LAND OF DEEPENING SHADOW By D. Thomas Curtin 

Revealing the Germany of fact in place of the Germany of tradition; 
telling the truth about Germany-in-the-third-year-of-the-war. 

12mo. Net, $1.50 
I ACCUSE ! (j'ACCusE!) By a German 

An arraignment of Germany by a German of the German War Party. 

Facts every neutral should know. 12mo. Net, $1.50 

THE GERMAN TERROR IN FRANCE By Arnold J. Toynbee 

THE GERMAN TERROR IN BELGIUM By Arnold J . Toynbee 

"From the facts he places before his readers, it appears conclusive that 
the horrors were perpetrated systematically, deliberately, under orders, 
upon a people whose country was invaded without just cause." — Phila- 
delphia Public Ledger, Each 8vo. Net, $1.00 

TRENCH PICTURES FROM FRANCE Sy Mojo, WUUam Redmond, M.P. 

Biographical Introduction by Miss E. M. Smith-Dampier 

A glowing book, filled with a deep love of Ireland, by one of the most 
attractive British figures of the war. 12mo. Net,, $1.25 

WOUNDED AND A PRISONER OF WAR By an Exchanged Officer 
The high literary merit, studious moderation and charming personality 
of the author make this thrilling book "the most damning indictment of 
Germany's inhumanity that has yet appeared." 12mo. Net, $1.25 

THE GERMAN FURY IN BELGIUM ByL.Mokveld 

"Some of the most brilliant reporting of all times was done by a few 
quiet individuals. Among the men who did the most brilliant work, 
Mokveld, of the Amsterdam Tijd, stands foremost."— Dr. Willem Hen- 
drik Van Loon. Net, $1.00 

MY HOME IN THE FIELD OF MERCY By Frances Wilson Huard 

MY HOME IN THE FIELD OF HONOUR By Frances Wilson Huard 
The simple, intimate, classic narrative which has taken rank as one of 
the few distinguished books produced since the outbreak of the war. 

Illustrated. Each 12mo. Net, $1.35 

GEORGE H. DORAN COMPANY Publishers New York 

PUBLISHERS IN AMERICA FOR HOPPER & STOUGHTON 



